Individuals tend to judge bad side effects as more intentional than good side effects (the Knobe or sideeffect effect). Here, we assessed how widespread these findings are by testing eleven adult cohorts of eight highly contrasted cultures on their attributions of intentional action as well as ratings of blame and praise. We found limited generalizability of the original side-effect effect, and even a reversal of the effect in two rural, traditional cultures (Samoa and Vanuatu) where participants were more likely to judge the good side effect as intentional. Three follow-up experiments indicate that this reversal of the side-effect effect is not due to semantics and may be linked to the perception of the status of the protagonist. These results highlight the importance of factoring cultural context in our understanding of moral cognition.
Introduction
The ability to distinguish between intentional and nonintentional action is an essential component of social cognition (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001) . In general, intentional harms are judged more harshly than unintentional harms (Cushman, 2008; Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007) . Intention-based moral evaluations and third party preferences are early developmental facts, observable in babies younger than 12 months (Hamlin, 2013; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson, 2009) . Some researchers have argued that the relation between attributions of intentional action and moral evaluations, either positive or negative, is an innate principle of our moral psychology, part of a ''universal moral grammar" (Mikhail, 2007) . As a case in point, in U.S. criminal law and the codes of most other cultures, intentional harms tend to be judged more severely than nonintentional harms (Fletcher, 1998; Green, 2000) . In the U.S., manslaughter is associated with lesser penalties (10-16 months in prison), whereas the federal sentence for murder ranges from 19.5 years in prison to a mandatory life sentence (Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual §2A1.1- §2A1.4). The punishment is different, even though the absolute outcome of the crime is the same.
Likewise, the severity of our moral judgments depends in general on our ascription of relative intention behind the offense.
Recent research in psychology and philosophy draws a complex picture of the relation between attribution of intentional action and moral evaluation. For example, numerous findings report that people are much more likely to judge that bad outcomes are brought about intentionally compared to good outcomes, the socalled side-effect effect or Knobe effect (original research by Knobe, 2003a Knobe, , 2003b Knobe, , 2005 Knobe, , 2006 Knobe, , 2010 Knobe & Mendlow, 2004 ; see additional studies by Cova & Naar, 2012; Cushman & Mele, 2008; Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009; Lanteri, 2012; Nadelhoffer, 2004a Nadelhoffer, , 2004b Nadelhoffer, , 2005 Nadelhoffer, , 2006 Pellizzoni, Girotto, & Surian, 2010; Sousa & Holbrook, 2010; Wright & Bengson, 2009 ). The side-effect effect has been claimed to reflect deep and fundamental facts about human cognition. However, these claims often occur in the absence of considerations of culture and context. Our approach here is cross-cultural. The general rationale guiding our study is that if these effects are truly intrinsic and pervasive facts about our moral psychology, they are likely to be universal and should hold outside the predominantly W.E.I.R.D. (White Educated Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) populations tested to date (Henrich, Heine, & Norensayan, 2010) . The question is whether these phenomena might hold across a wide range of cultures, as implied by many moral theorists studying the side-effect effect and allied phenomena.
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